Why Was the Irish Revolution of 1919-21?

On December 6 1921 the Anglo-Irish treaty was drafted and signed by representatives of some(prenominal)(prenominal) the Irish and British Govern custodyts. After centuries of bitter feuding involving both sides the British Government was for the frontmost time to offer the Irish liberty. In this show I seek to outline how the Irish transmutation of 1919 and 1921 was succeederful in achieving Irish liberty. Richard English give tongue tos, There had never been any chance of a formal multitude victory nor in practice of the British recognising an Irish republic. 1 If English is right to say this then how did the Irish manage to supercharge independence when the odds were stacked against them both militarily and semipolitic every last(predicate)y? I believe that independence was reached for a number of reasons to be discussed in more detail later. These horizontal surfaceors can be divided into the two crucial atomic number 18as of political and military. Politically, th ere was a list of British adversitys including the negative publicity attracted by the variation at home, pressure from America and the Government of Ireland feat. Failures scarcely exacerbated by political achievements on the Irish side.Such as De Valeras trip to the U. S to canvass American support for the revolution plus the establishment of Dail Eireann and its de facto courts. The adjoining section of the essay will be based on the military issues. Was the revolutions success down to Britains failures or Irelands triumph of military tactics? Military mistakes were made on the British side which nullified the fact that they had a vastly superior army. The rasping reprisals in nationalist territories for example stoked tensions unnecessarily. A large part of the revolutions success could be attri only whened to the military strengths of the individual retirement account.With Michael collins at the head the IRA was exceedingly strong tactically and used guerrilla warfare to great effect. The too had a mickle comprehension system to rival any match to figures same(p) Thomas Bowden for instance. Although some historians such as Peter stag try to unravel the legend of Michael Collins and believe he did not arrive at quite as big a role in the war as many would later carry. Political In drift for the revolution to work the IRA had to defeat Britain politically and in a propaganda war as well as militarily.It has to be noted that as far back as 1916 the Irish public had no arouse in a revolting. The men who took part in the Easter travel were looked upon as villains in the immediate aftermath not heroes. It was political failure that allowed such a dramatic swing in public reliance to take personate. The harsh treatment of the rebels was the turning point in Irish popular assessment. It formed the motivation for many who joined the IRA during the revolution becoming a superb propaganda tool for the republican cause. With each murder of the me n who took part in Ireland the fury grew.A student in the University College of capital of Ireland Barry once studied remarked, I never experienced anything like this billow fury with the news produced in every ace. 2 Later in the interview the student claims that there was notable rejoice when three Englishmen were shot for every Irishman hung. uncreated quotes like this go some way to showing the feelings of resentment caused by dint of Britains political own goals that multiplied the supporters of an armed revolution in a matter of days. It was not only public opinion in Ireland that was affected by the mistakes of the British administration.Public opinion in Britain throughout the revolution had reached a low. Many normal British citizens were horrified by what they maxim as atrocities going on in their get to. A sketch of opinion at the time can be viewed in a key of the grasp commission to Ireland in 1921. The report claims that the results of a government insurance of reprisals on the people manifests in three chief(prenominal) ways they are health economic and spirit. The report states, months of oppression, coercion, and physical violence cannot but come far reaching effects upon the people who suffer under them. The Labour party believed at the time that British Government policy was to the suffering of the economy both in Ireland and in Britain. While the armed forces seditious behaviour was only creating a new bitterness of spirit among the people. peradventure a concluding line from the document may sum up the thoughts and fears of many in Britain. Things are being done in the name of Britain which must make her name stink in the nostrils of the whole existence3 A crucial failure of British policy was the Government of Ireland Act passed in 1920.The Act was to create two subordinate parliaments one in Belfast and one in Dublin. The Belfast Parliament comprised of the same sestet counties that would later make up Northern Ireland. The Act was treat in the twenty six counties but the Dail was powerless to prevent its operation in the North. Ronan Fanning believes that the Act later caused the British to give away more independence than previously hoped by the very fact it had Ireland divided into separate legislative bodies never an intention of the Act. Britain continually faced U. S pressure to knead the Irish question.Lloyd George faced constant pressure from U. S president Woodrow Wilson. It is utter in Hopkinsons book that Wilson told him until the Irish question was resolved it was recoil to not only affect the relations between England and the U. S but inevitably effect the relationship of England with her colonies as well. 4 It would be wrong for one to say the Irish revolution of 1919-1921 in achieving Irish independence was all down to Britains failure politically. For one to do claim would do a great injustice to many strengths the Irish displayed politically forward independence was achieved.Thre e factors to be considered here are the rise of Sinn Fein, De Valeras poll of U. S support and the creation of the Dail parliament and Courts. The rise of Sinn Fein led to a radicalisation of the masses which had previously not existed in Ireland before this the majority were halcyon with Home Rule now it was all or nothing. When discussing this many historians would say that the rise Sinn Fein was as much if not more a essence of Britains failings more than any great genius on behalf of Sinn Fein. A school of thought shared by historians including Hopkinson and Dangerfield.Dangerfield was of the belief that by not implementing Home Rule the rise of a more radical authorities was unavoidable. The point is that when the concept of Home Rule vanished Nationalist Ireland drifted into a localisation were only republican and revolutionary drawship became possible. 5 Once this process had begun it was exactly irreversible. Whereas Hopkinson would state that the British Government h ad a misplaced optimism involving Sinn Fein. They tried to overcome them by making many arrests which all led to propaganda victories for the party.Who could now claim they were unjustly victimised. Like many some other British politician both before and since, they believed that a few extremists were the problem and that usual order would be restored once they were dealt with. 6 By trying to introduce conscription in Ireland Britain only managed to give Sinn Fein another boost. Townshend asserts, In resistance to conscription, the Sinn Fein leadershiphip found for the first time a national political issue which could mobilise the mass of the people. 7 Not all of Sinn Feins rise can be deuced on the British according to Peter Hart.The party he argued was reinforced by distaff involvement and the support of first time female voters. De Valeras visit to the Treaty of Versailles may not have dictated to the American backed independence hoped but was beneficial in other areas. Yet despite this there was support for his cause in America. tally to Ferriter, De Valera managed to raise something in the region of $6 million between January 1920 and October 1921 a figure higher than that raised in Ireland. Ferriter asserts that to call Irish patriotism a mass movement in the U. S by 1920 was no exaggeration.Perhaps the central political success by Ireland before eventually achieving independence was the creation of Dail Eireann on January 21 1919. An illegal parliament based in Dublin separate from British control. The Dail followed the path of which Ronan Fanning called Sinn Feins unilateral resolution to the age old problem of the constitutional relationship between Britain and Ireland was to abjure that there was any legitimate connection. 8 Thus it made sense that the Dails first law was to break with Britain. Townshend was complimentary in speaking of the decisiveness to set up Dail Eireann. Their (nationalists) action in assembling on 21 January 1919 as D ail Eireann, the Parliament of Ireland was in itself revolutionary. 9 At the beginning Britain simply ignored this new parliament. They shared the same beliefs Stephen Gwynn echoed in 1921. When the decision was taken to spend a penny the Irish members into an Irish parliament people were inclined to laugh. 10 Gwynn later claimed that the fact the British Government did not initially interfere merely added irreality to the whole proceedings. Yet many believe that when Britain did interfere in 1919 in censor the Dail more harm than good came as a consequence.Arthur Mitchell says the banning of the Dail was not its end but really its making driving it resistor was generally to its advantage. The fact that Dail Eireann created its own judicial system greatly undermined British rule. Ferriter points out positives and negatives of these courts. It was said, The promptness and efficiency of the courts impressed even most unionists. 11 Although at times reality bit as Ferriter tells us how figures such as Cathal Brugha the minister of defence had little time for courts they were a distraction from war.Military patronage all the ramifications of each sides political manoeuvres it is highly unconvincing of course the Irish revolution would ever have taken place were it not for what happened militarily. Similar to political, military could also be divided into both Britains failures and Irish success. How did the IRA gain a truce when they were battle the military might of the British Empire? If Englishs point earlier in the essay is to be considered the IRA could never have gained a formal military victory.Could it be a case that the British overestimated the IRAs staying power? For the IRAs key leader Michael Collins himself believed the IRA was close to breaking point. The British policy of reprisals was in itself a military disaster. Augustein puts the point across that, The actual and alleged problematic behaviour of the crown forces was an extremely persuasi ve force which caused and justified a violent response by the IRA in the eyes of men and women on all sides. 12 Thomas Bowden is of the view that reprisals were advocated at the very spend level of British intelligence.Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the Imperial General staff was a known sponsor of these methods declaring shoot all Irish leaders by roster. 13 On May 21 1921, General McCready sent a memo stating, Defeat the IRA by the summer or detachment It is possible the general did not want to get bogged down in a guerrilla conflict in unfamiliar terrain. Though historians like Townshend believe McCready was giving too much credit to the IRA who would short fall. While others including Hart have the view that the IRAs organic law was such McCready was right to issue the memo.In order to achieve independence the IRA had to have been strong militarily. Much of this is put at the door of historians to Michael Collins held by many as a master of tactician and great indicator of guer rilla warfare. Collins is chiefly judged in history as the main man behind the revolution. One such historian is Dangerfield who complements Collins highly. incomplete Richard Mulcahy, the volunteers chief of staff, nor the Minister of defence come close to Collins, with his administrative genius, his enormous energy, his warm blooded presence, his cold and concerted purpose. 14 Strong praise for a man Peter Hart claims never held a gun bet on 1916. For Collins was based in Dublin mainly undertaking intelligence duties. 1 English, p29 2 Augustein 3 Labour, pp54-56 4 Hopkinson, p33 5 Dangerfield, p246 6 Hopkinson, p31 7 Townshend, p318 8 Fanning pp1-2 9 Townshend, p328 10 Gwynn, p62 11 Ferriter, p202 12 Augustein, Motivation 13 Bowden, p119 14 Dangerfield, p313